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This thesis examines the problems that United States 
Navy nuclear propulsion programs might encounter if the 
United States agreed to sign a version of the proposed 
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) affecting the 
production of nuclear reactor fuel. The ultimate purpose of 
the FMCT is to contribute to the fulfillment of the goal of 
nuclear disarmament by terminating the production of 
plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapon purposes. 
This thesis explores the potential impact of an FMCT on the 
U.S. Navy’s nuclear propulsion systems.  It also examines 
other options that might be available to the United States 
Navy to proceed with its nuclear propulsion programs (such 
as using low-enriched uranium as reactor fuel) as well as 
to maintain the security of its propulsion reactor designs. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines the problems that United States 
Navy nuclear propulsion programs might encounter if the 
United States agreed to sign certain versions of the 
proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).   
The goal of the FMCT is to reinforce nuclear non-
proliferation norms. According to Article VI of the Nuclear 
Proliferation Treaty,  
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to 
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear 
arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control.1  
The ultimate purpose of the FMCT is to contribute to 
the fulfillment of the goal of nuclear disarmament by 
restricting the production of plutonium and highly enriched 
uranium for weapon purposes.  
Moreover, as three Rand Corporation experts have 
observed,  
Another [goal] is to prevent terrorist and other 
subnational groups from gaining access to nuclear 
weapons or to sensitive nuclear materials, i.e., 
plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU).2   
                     
1 Information Circular, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, International Atomic Energy Agency, 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.p
df (accessed September 25, 2009).  
2 Brian G. Chow, Richard H. Speier, and Gregory S. Jones, The 
Proposed Fissile - Material Production Cutoff – Next Steps, MR-586-1-
OSD, (Santa Monica, California, Rand 1995), ix.  
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This thesis explores how great an impact the FMCT 
might have on the U.S. Navy’s nuclear propulsion systems.  
The thesis also examines other options that might be 
available to the United States Navy to proceed with its 
nuclear propulsion programs, as well as to maintain the 
security of its propulsion reactor designs.  
B. IMPORTANCE  
In 1993, in a session of the United Nations General 
Assembly, President William Clinton proposed a treaty to 
stop the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear 
weapons.3  According to a CRS Report for Congress,  
Some perceive a ban on producing fissile material 
for weapons as much more relevant today as it was 
a decade ago, a view supported by the Bush 
Administration’s May 18, 2006 proposal.”4  
The report continues,  
Concern about terrorist access to large 
stockpiles of fissile material has only grown 
since the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs 
began in the early 1990s and particularly since 
September 11, 2001.5  
Moreover,  
Revelations about Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan’s 
nuclear black market sales of uranium enrichment 
technology in 2004 have spurred efforts not only 
                     
3 Sharon Squassoni, Andrew Demkee and Jill Marie Parillo, Banning 
Fissile Material Production for Nuclear Weapons:  Prospects for a 
Treaty (FMCT), CRS Report for Congress, 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS22474.pdf (accessed September 27, 2009). 
4 Ibid., 2. 
5 Ibid.  
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to shut down these illegal networks, but restrict 
even “legitimate” technology transfers.6   
Khan, who is best known as the father of Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapon program, was a key player in Libya’s effort 
to build nuclear weapons.7 
Given the large amount of highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) and plutonium that is potentially available to 
possessors of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, the 
United States, along with certain other nuclear powers, 
wants to prevent another “nuclear black market.”  With this 
in mind, the proposed FMCT requires that states cease the 
production of fissile material for the purpose of building 
nuclear weapons.  “The United States stopped producing HEU 
for weapons in 1964 and plutonium for weapons in 1988.  
Russia and the United Kingdom declared their cessation in 
1995; France declared a halt in 1996.”  It is assumed that 
China halted its production of HEU, but the Chinese 
government has not publicly announced it.8 
Some proposed texts for the FMCT would empower outside 
agencies to verify the compliance of a state’s nuclear 
program with the treaty obligations. The International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) might be asked to verify and 
account for all fissile materials.  Susan Koch has prepared 
a systematic and lucid exposition of the different 
                     
6 Squassoni, Demkee and Parillo, Banning Fissile Material Production 
for Nuclear Weapons. 
7 David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A. Q. Khan 
and Future Proliferation Networks,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 28 
(Spring 2005).113–114, available at 
http://www.twq.com/05spring/docs/05spring_albright.pdf (accessed 
September 20, 2009).  
8 Squassoni, Demkee and Parillo, Banning Fissile Material Production 
for Nuclear Weapons.  
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approaches to defining fissile material for treaty 
limitation purposes as well as a “cut-off,” plus divergent 
views on verification and participation in an FMCT regime.  
An FMCT could take many forms.9 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The FMCT is currently at the proposal stage. The draft 
FMCT that the Bush administration submitted on 18 May 2006 
is the only draft that any government has submitted, and it 
did not stipulate any provisions for international 
verification.10 The draft FMCT was accompanied by a white 
paper that stated that  
even with extensive verification mechanisms and 
provisions — so extensive that they could 
compromise the core national security interests 
of key signatories, and so costly that many 
countries would be hesitant to implement them — 
we still would not have high confidence in our 
ability to monitor compliance with an FMCT.11   
According to Arend Merburg and Frank N. von Hippel,  
The two primary concerns behind this conclusion 
appear to have been the difficulty of determining 
without unacceptable intrusiveness that HEU is 
not being diverted to weapons from the naval-
reactor fuel cycle and whether undeclared fissile 
                     
9 Susan Koch, “Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty,” in Taylor Bolz, ed., 
In the Eyes of the Experts:  Analysis and Comments on America’s 
Strategic Posture:  Selected Contributions by the Experts of the 
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States 
(Washington, D.C.:  United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009).  
10 Arend Merburg and Frank N. von Hippel, Complete Cutoff: Designing 
a Comprehensive Fissile Material Treaty, Arms Control Today, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_03/Meerburg_VonHippel (accessed 
September 20, 2009).  
11 United States of America White Paper on Fissile Material Cutoff 
Treaty, The United States Mission to the United Nation in Geneva, 
http://geneva.usmission.gov/Press2006/0518WhitePaper.html (accessed 
September 10, 2009).  
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material production capabilities might be present 
in nuclear-weapon-related facilities.12 
One of the various problems associated with certain 
proposed provisions of the FMCT stems from the fact that 
the U.S. Navy uses highly enriched uranium to fuel the 
propulsion systems of its submarines and its aircraft 
carriers.  If the United States ratified the treaty, 
depending on its terms, the U.S. Navy might have to do what 
the French Navy did — that is, shift its nuclear reactor 
fuel from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched 
uranium (LEU).13  This would be an expensive project, which 
the United States Navy does not wish to undertake. 
Along with the possibility of switching to LEU as a 
naval reactor fuel, the United States is not in favor of 
allowing foreign observers to see the U.S. Navy’s nuclear 
propulsion designs. Allowing foreign observers to inspect 
the U.S. Navy’s nuclear propulsion programs could create a 
serious vulnerability in the national security of the 
United States, because some verification inspectors might 
decide to “go rogue” and sell the information they may have 
acquired on the U.S. Navy’s nuclear propulsion program. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The thesis is based on unclassified sources, including 
government documents, scholarly articles, and press 
reports.  The goal of the thesis is to clarify the options 
that might be available to the United States Navy to 
                     
12 Merburg and von Hippel, Complete Cutoff: Designing a Comprehensive 
Fissile Material Treaty. 
13 Ibid., 3. 
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maintain its nuclear propulsion programs as well as the 
security of its propulsion reactor designs. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized as follows: The introduction 
will describe the thesis topic and research questions and 
the importance of the research. The second chapter will 
review the origins and history of proposals for an FMCT as 
well as the history of U.S. policy regarding an FMCT.  The 
third chapter will provide an analysis of how different 
treaty provisions in an FMCT could affect U.S. naval 
propulsion reactors.  This includes the costs and risks 
associated with verification arrangements and modified 
reactor designs.  The conclusion will present findings on 
the potential implications of an FMCT for U.S. naval 
nuclear propulsion systems. 
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II. THE ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF PROPOSALS FOR AN 
FMCT 
A. BACKGROUND 
The nonproliferation of nuclear weapons has been a 
long-standing objective of the United States, as well as 
other countries, since the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. After the Soviet Union successfully tested its 
atomic bomb (Figure 1), the United States and the Soviet 
Union embarked on a new phase of what was sometimes called 
the nuclear arms race. The United Kingdom, France, and 
China also acquired nuclear weapons.  The spread of nuclear 
capabilities raised questions about the security and 
stability of nuclear deterrence. 
 
  
Figure 1.   First nuclear weapons tests by current nuclear 
weapon states, 1945-2009.14 
                     
14 Global Fissile Material Report 2009, International Panel On 
Fissile Materials, 
http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr09.pdf (accessed 
November 17, 2009). 
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Concerned about the security and stability of the 
nuclear weapons era in prospect, the U.S. government 
sponsored a series of nuclear energy studies that became 
the foundation for the Baruch Proposal. Three studies are 
particularly noteworthy: the Jeffries Report, the Franck 
Report, and the Acheson-Lilienthal Report.  
B. THE JEFFRIES REPORT  
The Jeffries Report (sometimes referred to as the 
Prospectus on Nucleonics) was the first report to suggest 
how the U.S. government should address and develop nuclear 
energy.15  Rebecca S. Lowen has described the context in 
which Zay Jeffries worked, as well as his basic 
conclusions: 
These advocates of atomic energy [in 1946] were 
former Manhattan Project scientists familiar with 
the rigidity of military supervision and fearful 
that its perpetuation would seriously endanger 
scientific freedom. As one prominent atomic 
physicist explained to the Senate Committee on 
Atomic Energy, the atom had numerous peacetime 
applications that might never be brought to the 
service of mankind if scientists' research was 
controlled by the military.16  
But while some scientists stressed the benefits 
to be gained from atomic energy to insure freedom 
for their research, those speaking about atomic 
energy in terms of its economic and technological 
feasibility were often more pessimistic than 
industry about the possibility of the early 
                     
15 Henry D. Sokolski, Best of Intentions: America’s Campaign Against 
Strategic Weapons Proliferation (Westport, CT: Praeger Publisher, 
2001), 13.  
16 Rebecca S. Lowen, “Entering the Atomic Power Race: Science, 
Industry, and Government,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 102, No. 3 
(Autumn 1987), 464, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2151403.pdf, 
accessed (January 8, 2010).  
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development of atomic reactors. As early as 1944, 
some scientists at the government-financed lab in 
Chicago assessed the possible peacetime 
applications of the atom in "A Prospectus on 
Nucleonics" and concluded that developing atomic 
power to produce electricity would not be 
particularly lucrative. Large scale atomic power 
plants in fact would probably never be developed, 
wrote Zay Jeffries, a scientist from General 
Electric and author of the report, because they 
would be extremely expensive to build and operate 
and would use up the little uranium that was 
available.17 
Alexander Rabinowitch recalled how his father, Eugene 
Rabinowitch, who contributed to the Manhattan Project, had 
strong concerns about the use of atomic energy:  
Dad arrived in Chicago soon after the first 
controlled chain reaction in the windowless 
cellars below Stagg Field on December 2, 1942.  
Prior to the first chain reaction, the 
feasibility of developing an atomic bomb was 
uncertain.  After Enrico Fermi’s success, the 
creation of a bomb became likely, and project 
scientists began discussing the international 
political implications of atomic energy and how 
to convey their insights and worries about the 
future to the highest levels of government.18 
His first major contribution to formal 
consideration of these issues came in November 
1944.  He persuaded Robert Mulliken, information 
director of the Metallurgical Project and 
secretary of a committee formed to study post-war 
uses of atomic energy, to include a section in 
the committee’s report on the political and 
social impact of atomic energy.  The section, 
coauthored by him and Mulliken, emphasized the 
                     
17 Lowen, “Entering the Atomic Power Race,” 465.  
18 Alexander Rabinowitch, “Founder and Father,” Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, January-February 2005, 34, available at 
http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/u3j77748416631v7/fulltext.pdf. 
(January 2, 2010).  
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necessity of combining intensive development of 
nuclear energy with an effort to solve political 
problems worldwide. They argued that because it 
was inevitable that many nations would develop 
nuclear capabilities, a body to control military 
use of atomic energy must be created without 
delay.  A final section of what came to be known 
as the “Jeffries report” emphasized the need to 
establish efficient international supervision 
over all military aspects of atomic energy and to 
educate the public on atomic energy and its 
dangers for world security.19 
C. THE FRANCK REPORT 
The second of these early nuclear studies was the 
Franck Report.  This report, which was prepared for Arthur 
Compton, the director of plutonium production in the 
Manhattan Project, “was to explore how the development of 
atomic energy might be controlled after the war.”20 
According to Henry D. Sokolski,  
The Franck Report, written by some of the same 
authors as the Jeffries Report, reiterated that 
nuclear weapons advantaged offensive action and 
argued against the notion that the United States 
could stay ahead in a nuclear competition.”21   
According to Alexander Rabinowitch, 
The Franck report made two carefully reasoned 
points.  First, the development of nuclear power 
was fraught with infinitely greater danger of 
mutual annihilation than all inventions of the 
past, that its secrets would not remain an 
American monopoly for more than a few years, and 
therefore the only way of avoiding a potentially 
disastrous nuclear arms race was to secure 
immediate agreement on international control of 
                     
19 Rabinowitch, “Founder and Father,” 34.  
20 Sokolski, Best of Intentions, 13.  
21 Ibid.,14. 
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nuclear energy.  Second, the possibility of such 
an agreement would be gravely undermined if the 
United States first used the bomb in an 
unannounced attack against Japan.  Prospects for 
agreement would be optimized if the 
destructiveness of nuclear power was demonstrated 
for the world on an uninhabited desert or barren 
island and used only if the demonstration failed 
to induce Japan’s unconditional surrender.22 
D. THE ACHESON-LILIENTHAL REPORT 
The third report, the Acheson-Lilienthal report, was 
written by several of the top managers of the Manhattan 
Project in 1946. U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes 
established a special advisory committee, headed by Under-
Secretary of State Dean Acheson and the Chairman of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, David Lilienthal, to prepare a 
report that the U.S. Government would present to the United 
Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC). The committee 
submitted its report to Secretary Byrnes in March 1946.23  
Robert Oppenheimer wrote much of the so-called 
Acheson-Lilienthal report. Oppenheimer served as the 
committee’s chief scientific consultant. The report 
proposed the creation of the Atomic Development Authority 
to supervise the production and use of fissile materials, 
as well as the functioning of all nuclear facilities that 
could produce nuclear explosives. This proposed Atomic 
Development Authority would have the right to grant 
licenses to countries wishing to pursue peaceful nuclear 
research. The plan depended on Soviet-American cooperation. 
                     
22 Rabinowitch, “Founding and Father.”  
23 United States Department of State Diplomacy In Action, Treaty, The 
Acheson-Lilienthal & Baruch Plans, 1946, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/88100.htm (accessed January 2, 
2010).  
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The report’s authors recognized that the Soviet Union was 
unlikely to give up its veto power in the United Nations 
Security Council. Moreover, the report made no reference to 
when the United States would destroy its nuclear arsenal, 
though it did acknowledge that doing so would be a 
necessity for a nuclear-weapons-free world. 24 
 
 
Figure 2.   President Harry S. Truman and  
Secretary of State Dean Acheson. 25 
As Henry Sokolski has written,  
As long as nuclear weapons gave such a clear 
offensive advantage to their possessors, 
inspections and prohibitions against their 
possible production [with fissile materials] from 
civilian nuclear facilities would only encourage 
countries to cheat.  The only way around this 
problem was to prohibit nations from owning 
anything that might help them make a bomb and—as 
                     
24 United States Department of State Diplomacy In Action, Treaty, The 
Acheson-Lilienthal & Baruch Plans, 1946. 
25 The Manhattan Project, An Interactive History, U.S. Department of 
Energy, http://www.cfo.doe.gov/Me70/manhattan/international_control.htm 
(accessed January 2, 2010).  
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the Baruch Plan emphasized—to ensure that the 
penalties for violating the prohibitions were 
“swift and condign.”26 
E. THE BARUCH PLAN 
According to Edward Ifft,  
The effort to achieve broad acceptance of on-site 
inspection (OSI) is a story of high diplomacy, 
creativity, and determination through several 
U.S. administrations. The ambitious but somewhat 
naïve Baruch Plan, put forward by the United 
States in 1946 as a result of the Acheron-
Lilienthal Report, was the first great effort to 
control nuclear weapons.27 
As Joshua Williams has pointed out,  
The [Baruch] plan sought to establish an 
International Atomic Development Authority that 
would own and control all ‘dangerous’ elements of 
the nuclear fuel cycle, including all uranium 
mining, processing, conversion, and enrichment 
facilities.28 
As Henry Sokolski has observed,  
The idea was to control nuclear activities and 
materials so that any nuclear diversions would be 
noticed well before any nuclear explosive could 
be built.  The international authority’s 
safeguards system had to give “unambiguous and  
reliable danger signals if a nation takes steps 
that do or may indicate the beginning of atomic 
warfare.”29 
                     
26 Sokolski, Best of Intentions, 15.  
27 Edward Ifft, The Long Road To On-Site Inspection. Arms Control 
Today 34, no. 9, http://www.proquest.com, 27 (accessed January 6, 
2010). 
28 Joshua Williams, The Quick and the Dead, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1707
8 (accessed January 2, 2010).  
29 Sokolski, Best of Intentions, 15-16.  
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According to Joshua Williams,  
Moreover, since the objective of the Baruch Plan 
was not only to restrain the spread of nuclear 
weapons, but also to prevent an arms race and 
eliminate the bomb altogether, it proposed that 
once the Authority could ensure that no other 
state was able to construct the bomb, the United 
States would guarantee the elimination of its 
entire nuclear stockpile.30 
The authors of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report knew that 
the main threat with sharing nuclear facilities was that 
nuclear reactors produced not only power for electricity, 
but also plutonium, which might be used to make nuclear 
weapons.31  Therefore, Henry Sokolski noted,  
They insisted that the plutonium that power 
reactors produced had so little of the plutonium 
isotopes optimal for weapons construction (i.e., 
plutonium 239 and 241) that the material could be 
considered “denatured,” that is, unusable for 
military purposes.32  
Although the Acheson-Lilienthal report tried to 
establish a difference between “safe” and “dangerous” 
reactors, safe reactors “included nuclear piles optimized 
for power production (but not for production of plutonium  
239 and 241) and very small research reactors that could 
not produce a weapon’s worth of plutonium, even over a 
period of several years.”33 
The authors concluded that “safe” types of reactors 
“would be fueled with either low enrichment uranium (which, 
                     
30 Williams, The Quick and the Dead.  
31 Sokolski, Best of Intentions, 17.  
32 Ibid.,  
33 Ibid.  
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unlike highly enriched uranium, lacked sufficient fissile 
content, that is, high enough concentrations of U235, to 
make uranium weapons) or a mix of depleted uranium (U238) 
and denatured plutonium.”34  In contrast, breeder and 
military production reactors were dangerous for several 
reasons.   
First, they were optimized for plutonium 
production.  Second, they could be fueled with 
weapons-usable fissile materials (for example, 
separated plutonium, thorium, and enriched 
uranium, which could be directly used to make 
bombs).  Third, they could produce large 
quantities of the most readily weaponizable kinds 
of fuel: plutonium 239 and 241.35 
Joshua Williams concluded,  
The Baruch Plan tried to prevent the balance of 
terror that later defined the standoff between 
the United States and the USSR. But it failed, an 
early victim of the Cold War rivalry. Approved by 
the UN Atomic Energy Commission on December 31, 
1946, the plan was opposed by the Soviet Union in 
the UN Security Council. Close to achieving his 
own nuclear bomb, Stalin was not about [to] 
accept any plan that limited Soviet national 
sovereignty and that might have locked in, even 
if only for a short time, America’s nuclear 
advantage. Knowing that the Americans would 
refuse, the Soviets proposed that any agreement 
require Washington to disarm prior to some form 
of the Authority being put in place.36 
F. ATOMS FOR PEACE 
Following the Soviet rejection of the Baruch Plan in 
1946, the United States grew wary of the Soviet Union when 
                     
34 Sokolski, Best of Intentions, 17. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Williams, The Quick and the Dead. 
 16
it first exploded a nuclear device in 1949.  The big 
question that was on the minds of the leaders of the United 
States was whether the Soviets would use their nuclear 
forces against the United States, and if so, when.37  
With these questions on the minds of officials in 
Washington, including President Eisenhower, Henry D. 
Sokolski stated that,  
It was at this point that Eisenhower wrote that 
he began “to search around for any kind of idea 
that could bring the world to look at the atomic 
problem in a broad and intelligent way and still 
escape the impasse to action created by Russia’s 
intransigence in the matter of mutual or neutral 
inspection of resources.”38 
Sokolski pointed out how eager Eisenhower was to 
address the issue of Moscow’s aggressiveness.  
Eisenhower shared his thoughts with his special 
assistant for national security affairs, Robert 
Cutler: What if the superpowers contributed ‘X 
amount’ of fissile material for ‘peaceful’  
purposes, the amount X being a figure the U.S. 
could handle from its stockpile but that would be 
difficult for the Soviets to match?39 
Eisenhower’s primary agenda was not entirely to 
eliminate the Soviet ability to destroy the United States 
with one powerful blow, but to avoid having to go through 
the difficult negotiating issues associated with trying to 
put in place a comprehensive inspection system, a problem 
that derailed the Baruch Plan.40  
                     
37 Sokolski, Best of Intentions, 25.  
38 Ibid., 28. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid. 
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Although Atomic Energy Commissioner Lewis Strauss had 
some reservations about Eisenhower’s ideas, his concern was 
that “the plan might backfire with the United States giving 
too much material and the Soviets too little.”41 
Strauss then reported back to Eisenhower, with 
findings drawn almost directly from the Panel of 
Consultants’ earlier judgments about the Soviet threat:42  
If it could be agreed that as a preliminary step 
to total disarmament, both parties would in the 
first instance retain a minimum number of atomic 
weapons as a means of retaliating against 
aggressions (but not enough to mount an 
annihilating surprise attack) . . . it would 
represent progress in that the threat of war 
would then be reduced to a degree of injury that 
could be absorbed without total destruction.  The  
incentive to Russia to attack would be diminished 
by inability to make such an attack overwhelming 
and decisive.43 
Strauss argued that the steps needed to have 
Washington and Moscow agree on disarmament would be 
feasible if:  
(1) fissile contributions to the international 
pool could be steadily increased over time, (2) 
sufficient confidence could be built to close 
down all military fissile production plants and 
restrict mining and refining of uranium and 
thorium to existing facilities, and (3) Strauss’s 
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42 Ibid., 29.  
43 Lewis Strauss, memorandum for C.D. Jackson, November 6, 1953, 
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[materials] against theft (dilution of the 
material in large, remote, underground tanks) was 
adopted.44  
Sokolski has highlighted a fact of interest in 
reference to fissile material:  
With greater demand for contributed fissile 
material for civilian atomic applications, 
Strauss reasoned that even greater weapons 
stockpile reductions would have to be made.  
This, in turn, would reduce the Soviet military 
threat and make genuine East-West trust more 
likely.  The plan in its most advanced form (with 
a military fissile production cut-off) also had 
the advantage of not requiring international 
ownership (a Baruch measure that the Soviets 
opposed) and only limited inspections.  Thus, as 
Jackson, Dulles, Eisenhower, and Strauss later 
explained it, the plan could well lead to atomic 
disarmament even though its initial dimensions 
would be quite modest.45 
According to Peter Lavoy,  
In a celebrated address to the UN General 
Assembly on December 8, 1953, Eisenhower heralded 
a new Atoms for Peace campaign designed to 
‘hasten the day when fear of the atom will begin 
to disappear from the minds of people.’46 
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Figure 3.   Atoms for Peace Stamp Washington, D.C. -  
July 28, 1955, 133,638,850 issued.47 
In the end, Eisenhower’s primary goal was to promote 
peaceful uses of atomic energy.  He hoped that atomic 
energy could be used to enhance the socio-economic 
conditions of the world.  Eisenhower invited “the 
governments principally involved” to “make joint 
contributions from their stockpiles of . . . fissionable 
materials to an international atomic energy agency . . . 
set up under the aegis of the United Nations.”48 According 
to Eisenhower’s proposal,  
Mandated to collect, store, and distribute 
fissile materials, the proposed IAEA 
[International Atomic Energy Agency] would not 
have the ownership and punishment powers that 
doomed the chance for agreement on Baruch’s 
International Atomic Development Agency.  Rather, 
                     
47 Southwest Museum of Engineering, Communications and Computation: 
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the new agency and ‘uranium bank’ were intended 
as simple steps to establish international trust 
and draw Moscow into a cooperative arms control 
dialogue.49   
During the 1950s and 1960s, there were several 
proposals for the discontinuation of the production of 
fissile material for military uses. However, with the 
United States and the Soviet Union each pursuing its own 
stockpile of nuclear weapons, the production of fissile 
material continued to flourish.50 
Guy Roberts stated,  
The last official statement by the U.S. urging a 
fissile material production cutoff came in 1969 
at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.  
The U.S. proposed that IAEA safeguards would 
apply to fissile material production and would 
include verification of continued shutdown of 
production facilities.  Despite a lack of U.S. 
initiative the cutoff idea remained alive in the 
disarmament literature.51. 
G. PROPOSAL TO CONTROL OR CUTOFF THE PRODUCTION OF 
FISSILE MATERIALS SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR  
Since Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech, experts 
in nuclear matters have discussed alarming developments in 
nuclear proliferation. As Guy Roberts has further pointed 
out,  
For years arms control proponents have advocated 
halting the production of fissile material 
(separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium) 
                     
49 Eisenhower quoted in Peter Lavoy, 3.  
50 Guy Roberts, This Arms Control Dog Won’t Hunt: the Proposed 
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament, USAF 
Institute for National Security Studies (January 
2001)http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA435059&Location=U2&doc=G
etTRDoc.pdf (accessed December 1, 2009), 23.  
51 Ibid., 23.  
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as a means of capping the arsenals of the 
nuclear-weapon states (NWS). Since the 1970s, 
countries that have forsworn nuclear weapons have 
viewed a ban on fissile material production as an 
important way for the nuclear weapon states to 
show good faith toward nuclear disarmament—one of 
their obligations under the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In addition to being 
perceived as a step towards ultimate nuclear 
disarmament, arms control advocates (and the 
United States) also see a fissile material 
production cutoff as an important 
nonproliferation measure, one that would for the 
first time bring the undeclared nuclear weapon 
states—India, Israel, and Pakistan — and other 
states of proliferation concern into the 
international nonproliferation regime.  Although 
these states have remained unwilling to sign the 
NPT, it is argued that they may be persuaded to 
sign up to a cutoff ban, which would ensure that 
their nuclear arsenals and material stocks would 
be frozen at relatively low levels. 52 
One of the stated objectives of the United 
States’ current nonproliferation policy is to cap 
and eventually reverse the nuclear-weapon 
programs in these undeclared nuclear-weapon 
states. Another is to prevent terrorist and other 
sub-national groups from gaining access to 
nuclear weapons or to the fissile materials 
necessary for such weapons. 53 
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53 Ibid., 1-2.  
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Figure 4.   Map of the participants of the Nuclear 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT).54 
As the importance of the testing and production of 
nuclear weapons became evident, the objective of a fissile-
material cut-off shifted to a secondary role as the pursuit 
of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and other 
measures became the focus. Fear of the pollution caused by 
nuclear fallout overshadowed the pursuit of the fissile 
material cutoff proposals.  
Although the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which entered into effect in 1970, 
was intended to limit the number of nuclear weapons states, 
India, Israel, and Pakistan never acceded to the NPT and 
instead acquired nuclear weapons.  Moreover, North Korea 
withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and instead acquired nuclear 
weapons.55  
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In 1995, when India, North Korea, and Pakistan had not 
yet publicly revealed their status as nuclear weapon 
states, Brian Chow, Richard H. Speier, and Gregory S. Jones 
stated that  
One objective of current nonproliferation policy 
is to cap and eventually reverse the nuclear-
weapon programs in these undeclared nuclear-
weapon states.  Another is to prevent terrorist 
and other subnational groups from gaining access 
to nuclear weapons or to sensitive nuclear 
materials, i.e., plutonium or highly enriched 
uranium (HEU).  Such materials are produced in 
military and some civilian nuclear programs.56 
To help achieve these objectives, President 
Clinton outlined in September 1993 a “framework 
for U.S. efforts to prevent the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.”  This framework 
included a proposed multilateral convention 
prohibiting the production of plutonium or HEU 
unless it is for purposes other than nuclear-
weapon production and then only if it is done 
under international safeguards.  The United 
Nations General Assembly endorsed the proposal 
within three months subject to the important 
change that the convention be 
“nondiscriminatory,” that is, that it apply to 
declared and undeclared nuclear weapon-state 
states and nonnuclear-weapon states alike.57 
With regards to the framework that President Clinton 
outlined for a proposed multilateral convention, Sharon 
Squassoni, Andrew Demkee, and Jill Marie Parillo wrote, 
In response to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 
48/75L, the CD [Conference on Disarmament] established a 
committee in 1995 to begin work on an FMCT. The 66-member 
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negotiating body in Geneva agreed by consensus to the so-
called “Shannon Mandate,” which called for an “Ad Hoc 
Committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral 
and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty 
banning the production of fissile material for nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Canada’s 
Ambassador Shannon specifically noted that the mandate did 
not preclude any delegation from raising issues related to 
the scope of the treaty — whether banning future 
production, covering existing stocks, or adding management 
of stocks — during discussions.58 
Following the conclusion of Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty negotiations in 1996, FMCT appeared to be the next 
priority, yet CD member states could not agree on a program 
of work. In late 1998, CD members agreed to establish an Ad 
Hoc Committee, mostly in reaction to the Indian and 
Pakistani nuclear tests earlier that year, but the CD was 
unable to reestablish the Committee in 1999. Within the CD, 
four basic areas of work — nuclear disarmament, prevention 
of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), negative security 
assurances, and a fissile material production cutoff — 
still compete for priority. Moreover, several states prefer 
to link progress in one area to progress in another area, 
which some observers call “hostage-taking.” China, for one, 
has made its agreement to start FMCT negotiations 
contingent on the start of PAROS negotiations, and other 
states have done the same with respect to nuclear 
                     
58 Sharon Squassoni, Andrew Demkee and Jill Marie Parillo, Banning 
Fissile Material Production for Nuclear Weapons:  Prospects for a 
Treaty (FMCT), CRS Report for Congress, 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS22474.pdf (accessed February 17, 2010, 
4). 
 25
disarmament negotiations. In May 2006, the U.S. delegation 
told CD members it “sees no need at this time, however, for 
the negotiation of new multilateral agreements on nuclear 
disarmament, outer space, or negative security assurances.” 
In June 2006, a U.S. official told the CD that “...there is 
no — repeat, no — problem in outer space for arms control 
to solve.”59 
In May 2006, the George W. Bush administration 
presented the first draft treaty for an FMCT ever advanced 
by any government.  The treaty was entitled “Treaty on the 
Cessation of Production of Fissile Material for Use In 
Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices.”  The 
treaty began as follows: 
The States Parties to this Treaty (hereinafter 
referred to as the “Parties”), have agreed as 
follows:  Article I No Party shall, after the 
entry into force of the Treaty for that Party, 
produce fissile material for use in nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or 
use any fissile material produced thereafter in 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices.60 
The white paper on the FMCT made public by the U.S. 
government stated that: 
The U.S. draft treaty omits verification 
provisions, consistent with the U.S. position 
that so-called “effective verification” of an 
FMCT cannot be achieved.  The ability to 
determine compliance with a high level of 
confidence is a requirement for effective 
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verification.  The United States has concluded 
that, even with extensive verification mechanisms 
and provisions—so extensive that they could 
compromise the core national security interests 
of key signatories, and so costly that many 
countries would be hesitant to implement them--, 
we still would not have high confidence in our 
ability to monitor compliance with an FMCT. 
Furthermore, mechanisms and provisions that 
provide the appearance of effective verification 
without supplying its reality could be more 
dangerous than having no explicit provisions for 
verification.  Such mechanisms and provisions 
could provide a false sense of security, 
encouraging countries to assume that, because 
such mechanisms and provisions existed, there 
would be no need for governments themselves – 
individually or collectively – to be wary and 
vigilant against possible violations. 
Negotiating an international ban on the future 
production of fissile material for nuclear 
weapons will be a difficult enough task, in and 
of itself.  Avoiding time-consuming and, we 
believe, futile efforts to negotiate “effective” 
verification measures will expedite action by the 
CD to conclude a legally binding ban on the 
production of fissile materials for nuclear 
weapons and nuclear explosive devices. 
The United States believes that only by focusing 
on realistic objectives can the CD create the 
conditions necessary for negotiating an FMCT.  
The successful negotiation of an FMCT in the CD 
will be both a significant contribution to the 
global non-proliferation regime and an example of 
truly effective multilateralism.61 
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While it might have seemed that the United Nations had 
a consensus on how to curb the production of fissile 
material for nuclear weapons, Kingston Reif and Madeleine 
Foley stated,  
On May 18, 2006, the George W. Bush 
administration submitted a draft FMCT at the 
Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva that 
would not contain any verification provision, 
would ban new production of plutonium and highly 
enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons for 
15 years, and would enter into force with only 
the five established nuclear weapon states.62 
Reif and Foley further stated that they supported the 
approach advocated by the privately organized International 
Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) and rejected the U.S. 
approach set forth by the George W. Bush administration in 
May 2006.  According to Reif and Foley,  
The IPFM assumes that verification of a FMCT that 
covers both future production and pre-existing 
stocks would be overseen by the IAEA Safeguards 
Division and cover uranium enrichment facilities, 
reprocessing facilities, material declared in 
excess for military use, and HEU for use in 
naval-propulsion reactor fuel.  The Safeguards 
Division would have to greatly expand its 
operations to perform the intrusive searches 
necessary for verification.  It would also 
require a larger budget, a cost that countries 
may be loath to incur.63 
The Bush administration’s proposal had no verification 
provisions because of its judgment that an FMCT would not 
in fact be verifiable.  Some critics have argued, however, 
                     




that FMCT verification would be possible.  For example, 
Wade Boese wrote in 2005 that,   
Because the proposed agreement would allow 
countries to possess and produce plutonium and 
highly enriched uranium for peaceful purposes, 
most governments and nongovernmental experts see 
verification as essential for ensuring that such 
materials are not surreptitiously diverted to 
weapons. A verification system would also provide 
greater assurance that permitted materials are 
less vulnerable to terrorist theft because they 
would be subject to international supervision.  
The Bush administration's resistance to FMCT 
verification measures may also stem from the Navy's 
longtime opposition to allowing international inspectors 
some oversight of the U.S. naval nuclear propulsion 
program, which some countries say the treaty should 
require. When asked whether this was the case in a February 
[2005] interview, Chris Ford, the principal deputy 
assistant secretary of state for verification and 
compliance, replied,  
There are countries that have naval nuclear 
propulsion programs that would not agree to a 
treaty that would allow verifiers into all 
aspects of those programs; countries, plural.64 
Responses to the May 2006 U.S. proposal for an FMCT 
revealed a basic polarization on the question of the 
verifiability of a potential FMCT.  Proponents of a 
verification regime maintain that doubts about the 
verifiability of such a treaty (such as those expressed by 
U.S. officials under the George W. Bush administration) are 
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politically driven.  Skeptics on the verifiability of an 
FMCT maintain that their doubts are well-founded and that 
proponents of a verification regime are promising more than 
can be reliably delivered. 
The Bush administration did not hold that there should 
be no verification of an FMCT but that the treaty should 
have no verification provisions, and that verification 
should be via national technical means and methods. 
In March 2009, Cole Harvey of the Arms Control 
Association stated that,  
In recent public statements and congressional 
hearings, Obama administration officials have 
indicated that they will reverse Bush-era 
policies on a number of major arms control 
issues. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton 
and other Obama appointees have said that they 
will actively pursue ratification of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as well as a 
new strategic arms agreement with Russia and have 
revised the U.S. approach to negotiations on a 
treaty banning the production of fissile material 
for use in nuclear weapons.65 
Moreover, Harvey stated that  
Clinton noted in her confirmation hearing that 
the Obama administration planned to break with 
its predecessor by restoring U.S. support for a 
negotiating mandate calling for an eventual FMCT 
to include international monitoring and 
verification procedures. In May 2006, the Bush 
administration proposed a draft FMCT that lacked 
verification mechanisms, arguing that such 
provisions would be too expensive, overly 
intrusive, and unlikely to dissuade determined 
cheaters . . .  Other members of the CD 
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[Conference on Disarmament], which conducts its 
business by consensus, opposed the U.S. stance. 
Clinton stated in her testimony that abandoning 
the previous administration's policy is an 
essential step toward resuming FMCT 
negotiations.66 
In January 2009, the Secretary of State-designate, 
Senator Hillary Clinton, commented on the strong stance the 
Obama administration was going to take on nuclear 
proliferation,  
Therefore, while defending against the threat of 
terrorism, we will also seize the parallel 
opportunity to get America back in the business 
of engaging other nations to reduce stockpiles of 
nuclear weapons. We will work with Russia to 
secure their agreement to extend essential 
monitoring and verification provisions of the 
START treaty before it expires in December 2009, 
and we will work toward agreements for further 
reductions in nuclear weapons. We will also work 
with Russia to take U.S. and Russian missiles off 
hair-trigger alert, act with urgency to prevent 
proliferation in North Korea and Iran, secure 
loose nuclear weapons and materials, and shut 
down the market for selling them — as Senator 
Lugar has done for so many years. The Non-
Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the 
nonproliferation regime, and the United States 
must exercise the leadership needed to shore up 
the regime. So, we will work with this committee 
and the Senate toward ratification of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and reviving 
negotiations on a verifiable Fissile Material 
Cutoff Treaty.67 
 
                     
66 Harvey, Obama Sets New Course, 1-2.  
67 Transcript Of Clinton's Confirmation Hearing, NPR, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99290981 (accessed 
February 14, 2010), 4. 
 31
This strong commitment made by the incoming Secretary 
of State was soon followed by a more detailed statement by 
the Assistant Secretary of State-designate for the Bureau 
of Verification and Compliance, Rose Gottemoeller, in her 
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
March 26, 2009, 
Second, the Administration is committed to 
negotiating a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff 
Treaty (FMCT). The Conference on Disarmament has 
been deadlocked on the FMCT negotiation issue, 
with China, Iran, and Pakistan blocking any 
forward movement. I understand that one element 
of this deadlock had been the question of whether 
or not to include international verification 
provisions. We must use smart diplomacy to break 
this deadlock and pursue a Fissile Material 
Cutoff Treaty that includes verification 
provisions. If confirmed, I intend to focus 
comprehensively on verification issues affecting 
both the CTBT and FMCT, drawing on experience and 
expertise from the VC [Verification and 
Compliance] Bureau and across the U.S. 
Government, including the Intelligence Community 
and the Departments of Energy and Defense.68  
In April 2009, in a speech in Prague, President Barack 
Obama announced changes in the U.S. nuclear weapons policy.  
The president stated,  
And to cut off the building blocks needed for a 
bomb, the United States will seek a new treaty 
that verifiably ends the production of fissile 
materials intended for use in state nuclear 
weapons. If we are serious about stopping the 
spread of these weapons, then we should put an  
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end to the dedicated production of weapons-grade 
materials that create them. That's the first 
step.69 
Since the earliest U.S. proposals for controlling the 
production of fissile material, including the Jeffries 
Report and Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech, the 
United States has sought means to curb the spread of 
fissile material. The Clinton administration revived the 
idea of controlling and halting the production of fissile 
material for weapons. The Obama administration has 
expressed an intention to pursue policies different from 
those of the George W. Bush administration on the FMCT. 
Although there are many issues associated with the FMCT, 
such as the feasibility and cost of verifying a country’s 
compliance, as well as how a country could protect its 
secret technology, proposals for such a treaty may move 
forward in the months and years to come.  The issues for 
U.S. naval nuclear propulsion are addressed in the 
following chapter.  
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III. ANALYSIS OF HOW DIFFERENT FMCT PROVISIONS COULD 
AFFECT U.S. NAVAL PROPULSION REACTORS 
A. DEFINITIONS OF FISSILE MATERIAL 
To appreciate the importance of proposals for a 
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, one should have an 
understanding of the materials used to make a nuclear 
weapon.   In a paper entitled Banning Fissile Material 
Production for Nuclear Weapons: Prospects for a Treaty 
(FMCT), Sharon Squassoni and her colleagues explained the 
production of fissile material as follows:  
Such material — plutonium-239, uranium-233, and 
uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 — is 
produced several ways. Only the isotope U-235 
occurs naturally, but it cannot be used to create 
a nuclear yield unless it is concentrated 
significantly. Pu-239 is created in a nuclear 
reactor by irradiating natural uranium (U-238), 
which absorbs a neutron to decay into Pu-239. The 
Pu-239 must then be chemically separated from 
highly radioactive fission products to be usable 
in a nuclear weapon. Spent fuel reprocessing 
plants perform this chemical separation, but it 
can also be done on a smaller scale, with remote 
handling and adequate shielding against radiation 
hazards. U-233 is produced in a reactor by 
irradiating thorium-232, and also requires 
chemical separation from fission products. High-
enriched uranium (HEU), the ingredient in the 
first U.S. nuclear bomb, is produced by 
concentrating the isotope U-235 in an enrichment 
plant. Although HEU is defined as containing 20% 
or more U-235, weapons grade HEU generally 
requires about 90% U-235.70 
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David S. Jonas of the National Nuclear Security 
Administration stated,  
Yet some states may wish to limit [the] 
application [of an FMCT] to U-235 enriched to 
over 90%.  Some believe it should include 
tritium, americium, and neptunium-237.  Tritium, 
though, does not fission, so there is no valid 
reason for including it in a FMCT.  Since tritium 
boosts the power of a nuclear weapon, even though 
it would not be useful without HEU or Pu, some 
would like to see it in [an] FMCT.  Tritium must 
not be included since it would clearly be 
unacceptable to the NWS.71 
The United States draft of the FMCT, proposed by the 
George W. Bush administration, defines fissile materials, 
according to David S. Jonas, as,  
Pu except Pu where the isotopic composition 
includes 80% or greater Pu-238 and uranium 
containing 20% or greater enrichment in U-233 or 
U-235.72 
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Figure 5.   Cut-away of a nuclear warhead which contains 
electronic and nuclear explosives, often referred to as the 
“physical package.”73 
B. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF “LOST” HEU  
William C. Potter has drawn attention to the “special 
dangers” of HEU. 
In a pre-9/11 environment in which states 
constituted the main nuclear proliferation 
challenge, it made sense to treat HEU and 
plutonium as roughly equivalent dangers. Today, 
however, in a world where non-state actors pose 
greater threats in terms of the likely use of 
nuclear explosives, more effort should be 
invested in rapidly securing, consolidating, 
reducing, and eliminating global stocks of HEU. 
The principal reason for this needed shift in 
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policies of most national governments, is the 
much easier task for terrorists of building an 
HEU-based nuclear explosive.74 
The most basic type of nuclear weapon, and the 
simplest to design and build, is a ‘‘gun-type’’ 
device. As its name implies, it consists of a gun 
barrel in which a projectile of HEU is fired into 
another stationary piece or ‘‘target’’ of HEU. 
Each piece of HEU is subcritical and by itself 
cannot sustain an explosive chain reaction. Once 
combined, however, they form a supercritical mass 
leading to a nuclear explosion. Although weapon-
grade uranium enriched to over 90 percent of the 
isotope uranium-235 (U-235) is the most effective 
material for a gun-type explosive, a nuclear 
detonation can be produced with lower levels of 
enrichment. The Hiroshima bomb, for example, used 
about 60 kilograms (kg) of uranium enriched to 80 
percent. Terrorists would probably need at least 
40 kg of weapon-grade or near-weapon-grade HEU to 
have reasonable confidence that an IND 
[improvised nuclear device] would work.75 
C. DIFFERING VIEWS ON FMCT PROVISIONS 
There are differing views as to what an FMCT should 
limit and what its verification requirements should be. The 
FMCT proposed by the U.S. government in May 2006 would not 
affect the United States Navy’s nuclear propulsion program 
at all. In contrast, the FMCT proposed by the International 
Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) would require special 
arrangements to verify that the HEU used as fuel in U.S. 
naval reactors is not used for weapons.  Some other FMCT-
related proposals could affect the nature of the  
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verification process, as well as naval propulsion reactor 
designs, and could lead to changes in current and future 
nuclear-powered vessels. 
D. IS THERE A NEED FOR HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM FOR NAVAL 
REACTORS? 
Chunyan Ma and Frank von Hippel are quoted extensively 
in this chapter due to their dedicated efforts to identify 
approaches to more comprehensive FMCT regimes.  
Specifically, they have argued that an FMCT regime could be 
devised to cut off the production of fissile material 
intended for naval propulsion, as well as for nuclear 
weapons and other nuclear explosives.  
In an article published in 2001, Chunyan Ma and Frank 
von Hippel, a researcher in China’s Defense Science and 
Technology Information Center and a professor at Princeton 
University respectively, wrote,  
Currently, the United States and the United 
Kingdom use ‘weapon-grade’ uranium containing 
more than 93 percent uranium-235 (U-235) to fuel 
their naval reactors, and Russia uses HEU 
containing more than the 20 percent U-235, 
defined by international agreement to be the 
threshold for direct weapons-usability.  France 
has fueled some of its submarines with HEU but 
has decided to shift to low-enriched uranium 
(LEU) containing less than 20 percent U-235.  
China reportedly uses LEU fuel.  In the past, 
both the United States and the Soviet Union built 
HEU-fueled nuclear reactors for other military 
purposes.76  
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According to Morten Bremer Maerli of the Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs,  
No official figures exist on the U.S. stockpiles 
of HEU for naval purposes or material destined 
for future naval consumption.  Estimates indicate 
an overall consumption of HEU in U.S. reactors 
since the dawn of nuclear propulsion of 
approximately 120 tons — some 12% of the total 
U.S. HEU production of nearly 1,000 tons.77 
 
 
Table 1.   National stocks of highly enriched uranium in  
mid 2008.78 
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Scholars such as Chunyan Ma and Frank von Hippel have 
argued that the United States could comply with their 
proposed version of an FMCT by banning not only the 
production of fissile materials for weapons, but also by 
extending it to any weapon-usable fissile materials for any 
military use, including naval propulsion reactors.79  
Chunyan Ma and Frank von Hippel have further stated 
that countries such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Russia, currently employ naval reactors that 
use HEU. These countries, according to Ma and von Hippel, 
can enjoy the luxury of decades of planning for a 
transition to LEU.  While in this “transition” period, they 
have asserted, these states will have the time needed to 
design the “next generation” of LEU-powered submarines.  If 
the FMCT is to be upheld and honored by all parties, Ma and 
von Hippel maintain, countries joining in the nuclear navy 
propulsion “club” would have to fuel their naval reactors 
with LEU.80 
According to Chunyan Ma and Frank von Hippel,  
The world’s nuclear fleet currently contains 170 
submarines and ships, including six icebreakers 
and an Arctic transport operated by Russia.  This 
is about half the size of the nuclear-powered 
fleet deployed at the end of the Cold War.81 
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Table 2.   Evolution of the World’s Nuclear Submarine 
Fleets.82   
Ma and von Hippel have noted that the United States 
has consistently increased the nuclear core lifetime for a 
submarine from about two years (the first U.S. nuclear-
powered submarine, the Nautilus), to a 33-year life for the 
new Virginia-class submarine:   
Current cores in the Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, 
Los Angeles-class attack submarine and Ohio-class ballistic 
missile submarine last an average of about 20 years.  
Efforts are continuing to develop lifetime cores for new 
aircraft carriers (50 years) and the next generation 
ballistic missile submarine (40 years).83 
Ma and von Hippel maintain:  
During the 1980s, the U.S. Navy ordered four to 
five metric tons of U-235 in HEU per year.  
However, the size of the US nuclear submarine 
                     
82 Ma and von Hippel, “Ending the Production of Highly Enriched 
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fleet has declined from 139 in 1990 to 73 (18 
ballistic missile submarines and 55 attack 
submarines) in 2000 and the number of naval 
propulsion reactors has decreased to 97.  Given 
that improved uranium efficiency is likely to 
have contributed to the greater longevity of the 
new reactors, the annual requirement for American 
nuclear submarines today is probably very roughly 
two tons [of] U-235.  For a nominal core life of 
20 years, this would imply an average of five 
cores per year containing about 400 kilograms 
(kg) of U-235 each.84 
A number of authors estimate that the total 
stockpile of U-235 in U.S. HEU was approximately 
600 tons.  This total has since been reduced by 
174 tons of HEU (almost all lower than weapon-
grade) being declared excess to military needs.  
However, much of the weapon-grade uranium 
recovered from excess nuclear weapons is being 
placed in a reserve for future naval reactor use.  
As a result, the United States has enough HEU 
stockpiled to fuel its nuclear ships at the 
current rate for “many decades.”85 
                     
84 Ma and von Hippel, “Ending the Production of Highly Enriched 
Uranium for Naval Reactors,” 92.  
85 Ibid., 89. 
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Table 3.   Estimated annual HEU consumption in naval 
vessels.86 
Figure 8 suggests that the use of HEU in naval vessels 
peaked during the early 1990s (coincident with the end of 
the Cold War), and that it has dramatically decreased in 
subsequent years. Alexander Glaser and Zia Mian of 
Princeton University have reached findings similar to those 
of Chuyan Ma and von Hippel.  According to Glaser and Mian,  
The United States appears to be committed to 
maintaining its reliance on nuclear propulsion 
for its aircraft carriers and submarines, and 
possibly expanding it to include nuclear-powered 
cruisers. The 128 tons of HEU that the United 
States has set aside for military naval nuclear 
propulsion would be sufficient to fuel its 
surface ships and submarines for 40–60 years. In  
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2008, the U.S. Senate required the navy to study 
the possibility of LEU fuel for future nuclear 
powered ships.87 
It is clear that the United States will be able to 
sustain its submarines and aircraft carriers with HEU for 
several decades.  However, should the United States convert 
to low enriched uranium (LEU) as reactor fuel, Ma and von 
Hippel argue, it could then meet the proposed requirements 
of the FMCT as delineated by those who advocate extending 
the FMCT to the production of fissile material for naval 
propulsion.  Ma and von Hippel make this argument by citing 
the French example.  
Different classes and generations of French 
submarines use different fuel enrichments.  The 
first three of France’s first-generation (1970s) 
Redoutable-class ballistic missile submarines 
were reportedly fueled by LEU.  However, the 
fourth and fifth ballistic missile submarines in 
this series were shifted to HEU.  France’s first 
generation of attack submarines, the Rubis class, 
and a second generation of ballistic missile 
submarines, the Triomphante class, returned to 
LEU fuel. . .  In the wake of France’s decision 
to end the production of HEU, its intention 
appears to be to stay with LEU enriched to less 
than 10 percent. 
Based on its current plans, in 2015 France is 
expected to have the same number of nuclear-
powered submarines as it has in January 2001: 
four ballistic-missile submarines and six attack 
submarines — plus one nuclear-powered aircraft 
carrier.88 
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Figure 6.   Integrated Reactor and Steam Generator in 
France’s Rubis Nuclear-Powered Submarine.89 
Clearly, Ma and von Hippel regard converting from HEU 
to LEU as reactor fuel desirable; however, the United 
States Navy does not view it as such.  In a 1995 report to 
the U.S. Congress, the Director of the Office of Naval 
Nuclear Propulsion (ONNP) stated that 
[U.S.] Naval reactor cores have evolved in 
compactness to the point where the maximum amount 
of uranium is packed into the smallest volume, 
and the only way to make more volume available 
for uranium would be to remove cladding, 
structure or coolant.  In other words, no more 
uranium could be packed into a modern long-lived 
core without degrading the structural integrity 
or cooling of the fuel elements.90 
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Figure 7.   Separate Reactor and Steam-Generator in U.S. 
Nuclear Submarines.91 
The Director of the ONNP described the findings of two 
alternatives for using uranium enriched to 20 percent for 
reactor cores: 
1. Keep the size of the cores fixed and replace 
the weapon-grade uranium with an equal amount of 
LEU.  This would reduce the amount of U-235 in 
the cores by a factor of 4.7.  According to the 
ONNP report, such a reduction would reduce the 
core life for the Virginia-class submarine from 
33 to 7.5 years, and, for Trident-class 
submarines and Nimitz-class aircraft carriers 
equipped with 45-year cores, to 14 and 10.4 years 
respectively. 
2.  Increase the volume and hence the amount of 
uranium until the same core life can be achieved 
with LEU. The ONNP report states that the volume 
of the core would have to be increased by 
approximately a factor of three.  This is less 
than the ratio of 4.7 between the amount of 20-
percent LEU and weapon-grade uranium containing 
93 percent U-235 because some of the uranium-238 
(U-238) added to the fuel would be converted by 
neutron absorption to fissile plutonium fuel.  
                     
91 Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion, Report on Use of Low Enriched 
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Also, the larger reactor would have the same 
power as the smaller reactor and therefore would 
not require proportionally more cooling.92 
In another article, von Hippel wrote,  
Converting U.S. and U.K. naval reactors to LEU 
would be more difficult [than would be the case 
for some countries’ naval reactors]. French and 
Russian reactors are refueled every 5 to 10 
years. The U.S. and U.K., in an effort to avoid 
refueling shutdowns, are moving to reactor cores 
designed to last the lifetime of the ship—up to 
45 years. In a 1995 report to Congress, the 
Department of Energy’s Office of Naval Nuclear 
Propulsion asserted that the density of the 
uranium in its naval-reactor fuel could not be 
increased and that, therefore, if the core 
lifetimes were to be preserved, conversion to LEU 
would require three times larger and 
proportionately more costly cores.   There has 
been no independent peer review of this 
conclusion. Since naval-reactor fuel designs are 
classified, such peer review would have to be 
done on a classified basis.93 
E. VERIFICATION OF THE NAVAL NUCLEAR PROGRAM UNDER THE 
PROPOSED FMCT 
One of the most important questions associated with an 
FMCT is how to verify a country’s compliance. As Guy 
Roberts pointed out,  
During full-fledged negotiations, the 
verification aspect of a fissile material cutoff 
agreement is very likely to prove one of the most 
politically difficult and, in varying degrees, 
technically complex issues. Two questions that 
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immediately stand out, which are closely related 
but separate are: what should be the role of the 
IAEA in cutoff verification? And what overall 
verification approach or architecture should 
guide crafting of a cutoff verification regime? 
In deciding whether to follow a comprehensive or 
streamlined approach towards verification, 
efforts must be made to contain perceptions of 
unfair discrimination between non-nuclear and 
nuclear countries as well as to avoid major 
inconsistencies between traditional IAEA 
verification and that of a cutoff convention.94 
However, there are countries, including the United 
States, that go to great lengths to protect their naval 
nuclear propulsion programs.  According to Morten Bremer 
Maerli,  
All the five declared nuclear weapon states under 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty possess nuclear-
propelled submarines. However, as nuclear weapon 
states, they are all exempted from international 
(IAEA) safeguards and other monitoring 
activities. Sensitivity issues and the strategic 
importance of nuclear submarines have led the 
nuclear weapon states to maintain a high degree 
of secrecy around their own nuclear naval 
operations. Very little is officially known about 
U.S. and Russian submarine nuclear fuel designs, 
production technology, operational data and naval 
fuel stocks.95 
Although it would be extremely difficult for these 
states with nuclear-powered submarines to open their 
programs to international inspection, David S. Jonas 
emphasized that some observers find merit in programs to 
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verify the “shape, composition and mass” of the “pits” of 
nuclear weapons as a potential precedent for verifying 
reactor fuels. 
While the Bush Administration has concluded that 
it would be practically impossible to make a FMCT 
effectively verifiable, others, including John 
Carlson of the Australian Safeguards and 
Nonproliferation Office, maintain that it would 
be possible. Carlson points to the example of the 
Trilateral Initiative between the United States, 
Russia, and the IAEA, which has demonstrated that 
it can be practical to verify fissile material of 
sensitive shape, composition and mass. He 
suggests a similar mechanism for verification of 
naval fuels. Of course there are great 
differences in the scale of operations between 
the verification of “pits” from nuclear weapons 
under the Trilateral Initiative, and the 
verification of naval fuels. Additionally, the 
Trilateral Initiative involved nuclear weapon 
pits in storage containers in known locations. A 
truly verifiable FMCT would have to be able to 
detect undeclared, clandestine enrichment and 
reprocessing activities.96 
Carlson concedes that it would be impractical to 
have an FMCT verification regime of wide scope, 
which would include all nuclear facilities and 
materials except existing stocks and 
nonproscribed military activities such as naval 
propulsion. The other option, which he 
recommends, is the “focused” approach which would 
only concentrate on the most proliferation 
sensitive fissile material production facilities—
specifically enrichment and reprocessing 
facilities.97 
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Guy Roberts stressed the importance of the financial 
costs of the verification of stocks of fissile materials 
and related production sites.  
A 1995 IAEA comparison of the annual cost of full 
verification of separated fissile material and 
facilities capable of producing such materials 
was $90 million, only one-third less than the 
estimate of $140 million per year for full 
safeguards on all civilian facilities in the NWS. 
While most agree that in the event there is an 
FMCT the IAEA is the ideal agency to serve as the 
verification instrument, unfortunately, the IAEA, 
in its present financial condition, will be 
unable to fulfill any such role unless the states 
parties agree to full funding to support these 
additional costs.”98 
The safeguards operations budget of the IAEA in 
2000 was over $80 million. It would be almost 
tripled to $200 million/year for the most costly 
comprehensive FMCT verification approach 
considered in the 1995 IAEA working paper. This 
$140 million increase would be tiny, however, in 
comparison with the operational cost savings 
realized by the NWS as a result of shutting down 
their fissile-material production complexes. From 
1984 through 1993, the United States alone spent 
about $2 billion per year on plutonium production 
for weapons. From 1954 through 1963, before the 
United States ended the production of HEU for 
weapons and began shutting down many of its 
plutonium-production reactors, the annual 
American rate of expenditure for the production 
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The building of a regime that would have the necessary 
financial support, as well as the capability to verify a 
country’s capacity to produce fissile materials, is a 
distant prospect.  The U.S. Navy has adopted a prudent and 
cautious approach.  According to Morten Bremer Maerli,  
In fact, the U.S. Navy has been proceeding with 
extreme caution, keeping in military reserve all 
the fissile material usable for naval propulsion. 
The low proportion of higher enrichment levels in 
HEU declared excess to national security needs 
stems from U.S. Navy insistence that such 
material be reserved for its possible future 
needs. With the exception of the first 10 tons 
declared excess, all of the HEU that the U.S. has 
declared excess failed to meet the specifications 
for use in naval fuel.
 
Of the 174.3 excess tons of 
HEU, about 33 tons are enriched over 92%, and 142 
tons are enriched between 20 to 92%.100 
Moreover, the pledges given by the U.S. that no 
fuel ever put under international safeguards will 
be withdrawn for military purposes do not apply 
to the Navy. It could withdraw HEU that has been 
declared excess to national security needs and 
put under safeguards, to use it as naval reactor 
fuel.
 
However, the Navy has never evoked its 
unique pullback option. The U.S. Navy plans well 
and probably does not intend to use currently 
safeguarded excess material for its programs; 
moreover, attempting to do so would [face] a 
steep uphill political climb. The policy of 
withdrawal allowance should undergo review, as it 
is likely to undermine the evolving norm of 
irreversibility in nuclear arms control.101 
Chunyan Ma, Frank von Hippel, and certain other 
scholars have argued that future United States naval 
nuclear propulsion reactors could power vessels with LEU. 
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However, despite their recommendations, it will probably be 
at least fifty years or more before the U.S. Navy begins to 
operate nuclear-powered vessels with LEU.  The following 
chapter discusses recommendations on the appropriate policy 
for the United States concerning arrangements relevant to 
the how the U.S. Navy might fare under a possible FMCT. 
 52
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IV. CONCLUSIONS  
Although states such as Brazil and France have 
converted their nuclear-powered submarines from HEU to LEU, 
the United States Navy does not currently see such a 
conversion as a viable option.  The United States Navy also 
has concerns about verification under a possible FMCT. As 
noted in the previous chapter, 
All the five declared nuclear weapon states under 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty possess nuclear-
propelled submarines. However, as nuclear weapon 
states, they are all exempted from international 
(IAEA) safeguards and other monitoring 
activities. Sensitivity issues and the strategic 
importance of nuclear submarines have led the 
nuclear weapon states to maintain a high degree 
of secrecy around their own nuclear naval 
operations. Very little is officially known about 
U.S. and Russian submarine nuclear fuel designs, 
production technology, operational data and naval 
fuel stocks.102 
According to Glaser and Mian,  
The 128 tons of HEU that the United States has 
set aside for military naval nuclear propulsion 
would be sufficient to fuel its surface ships and 
submarines for 40–60 years.103 
Vessels that will be built in the future will have the 
technology to be in service at least fifty years.  For 
example, the U.S.S. Enterprise (CVN 65), the world’s first  
 
 
                     
102 Maerli, Components of Naval Nuclear Fuel Transparency, NATO-EAPC 
Fellowship Report),11. 
103 Glaser and Mian, “Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production, 
2008,” 61.  
 54
nuclear powered aircraft carrier, and the oldest, is 
scheduled to be decommissioned in 2013 after 51 years of 
service.   
Should the proposed FMCT take effect, the United 
States Navy can continue to build submarines fueled by HEU 
while designing a prototype submarine (similar to the Deep 
Submergence Vessel NR-1)104 powered by a nuclear reactor 
that is fueled with LEU and studying its performance.  Such 
studies can include the endurance and sustainment of the 
submarine, the re-fueling intervals of the LEU fuel, as 
well as the cost analysis of powering the submarines with 
LEU fuel.   
As for the verification process, the ships and 
submarines of states that already use HEU as reactor fuel 
would not have to be verified as long as the treaty stated 
that its provisions would not apply to them.  
The draft FMCT that was prepared by the non-
governmental International Panel on Fissile Materials 
(IPFM) in 2009 suggested that the IAEA would be the ideal 
organization to support an FMCT, as this might ease the 
concerns of the United States over verification of its 
nuclear program: 
The IPFM believes that an FM(C)T could be 
verified as effectively as the Nonproliferation 
Treaty. Our draft treaty therefore requires 
verification. As with the NPT, the draft treaty 
calls upon the IAEA to implement the needed 
verification arrangements, but these arrangements 
are not spelled out in the treaty itself. The 
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Panel has developed specific ideas on 
verification, however. Some of these have been 
laid out in our Global Fissile Material Report 
2008(GFMR08).105 
There are compelling reasons for the IAEA to take 
on responsibility for verification. The IAEA has 
extensive experience in inspecting nuclear 
installations and nuclear materials, including in 
the NPT nuclear-weapon states under their 
voluntary safeguards agreements. The obligations 
of nuclear-weapon states under the FM(C)T will 
overlap strongly with the obligations of non-
weapon states under the NPT and will become more 
similar as nuclear disarmament proceeds. The 
IAEA, advised by national experts, might begin 
the development of a model protocol in advance of 
the completion of an FM(C)T.106 
To undertake the new responsibilities, the IAEA’s 
Safeguards Division will have to grow 
substantially. Additional funding will be 
required for such an expansion but it will be 
miniscule in comparison, for example, with the 
cost either of nuclear-weapon programs or of the 
production of nuclear energy.107 
The IPFM has suggested that entrusting the IAEA with 
the responsibility of performing verification might end the 
stalemate with the United States, and lead Washington to 
change its policy regarding a proposed FMCT, since it is 
already a party to the NPT.  However, the United States 
government has historically expressed some uncertainties 
and reservations about FMCT verification, including with 
IAEA involvement.  
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The following considerations are some of the key 
points concerning how a proposed FMCT might ultimately 
affect U.S. interests concerning nuclear naval propulsion:  
• The likelihood of political agreement on an FMCT is 
very low. 
• The conclusion of an FMCT encompassing fissile 
materials for naval propulsion is even more remote.  
None of the P-5 countries would accept such an FMCT,  
nor would Brazil or any other country interested in 
naval nuclear propulsion. 
• The establishment of transparency and verification 
measures is not equivalent to actual verifiability.  
The practical feasibility of the reliable 
verification of all weapons-grade enrichment, 
including that involved in the production of fissile 
material for naval propulsion reactors, has not been 
demonstrated.  Governments will always retain an 
ability to resume production, even if they have 
agreed to an FMCT. 
• The verification of existing stocks would require 
highly intrusive measures.  Existing stocks might 
function as a reservoir into which a state might 
pour new production.  An obvious means of cheating 
would be to keep existing stocks at a constant level 
while, in fact, producing new quantities of fissile 
material. 
• The United States government should not, and 
probably will not, endorse an FMCT that would affect 
the production of fissile materials for naval 
nuclear propulsion. The U.S. government has 
 57
consistently held that an FMCT should be limited to 
prohibiting the production of fissile materials for 
weapons and other nuclear explosives. 
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